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The economic impact of immigrant 
workers in Western Europe 
Stephen Drawer 
Within Western Europe policies and attitudes concerning immigrants are the subject 
of considerable emotional dispute.  Are immigrants the cause of  bad housing,  crowded 
schools, urban slums and increased crime rates, or are they exploited minorities discrimi-
nated against because of  class and colour? Such questions are seldom considered with any 
great detachment, and indeed it is hard to  be impartial about the  political  and social 
implications  concerning  the  growing  impact of immigrant  workers.  However,  though 
political and social considerations are certainly central to any overall assessment of  the 
impact of  immigration on either the donor or recipient countries, the following economic 
analysis should assist in creating a more objective understanding of  the immigrant's role 
in  Western European societies. 
Structure of Immigration 
In 1970 there were nearly 11  million immigrants in 
the countries of Western Europe, that is,  over 5 per 
cent of the total population. The proportion in each 
country ranged from 0·6 per cent in the Netherlands 
to 16·0 per cent in Switzerland (Table 1  ).  Over 90 per 
cent of  these immigrants lived in four countries, France, 
Germany, United Kingdom and Switzerland, and in 
addition 7·1  per cent and 8·3 per cent respectively of 
the total Belgium  and Luxembourg populations are 
immigrants. 
Table 1 
Immigrants in  Western Europe  (1970) 
Total  Immigrants 
Country  Immigrants  Population  as% of Total 
(Thousands)  (Thousands)  Population 
Austria*  68  7,323  0·9 
Belgium  679  9,581  7·1 
France  3,177  49,866  6·4 
Germany  2,977  62,000  4·8 
Great Britain  2,603  52,304  5·0 
Luxembourg*  28  335  8·3 
Netherlands*  72  12,597  0·6 
Sweden*  173  7,869  2·2 
Switzerland  972  6,071  16·0 
Total  10,749  207,946  5·2 
*Indicates economically active immigrants only. 
Source:  Castles,  S.  and Kosack,  G.,  Immigrant  Workers 
and  Class  Structure  in  Western  Europe,  OUP  (London, 
1973). 
The economic impact of people from one country 
to another is two-way, affecting both the recipient and 
donor countries. Spain, Portugal, Yugoslavia, Turkey, 
Algeria,  India,  Pakistan  and  Ireland  are  the  main 
donor countries. Their incomes per head are approxi-
mately  one-half of those  in Switzerland,  Germany, 
France and the United Kingdom, the main recipient 
countries.  This flow  of people,  the vast majority of 
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whom are productive workers, is thus from the poorer 
countries of Southern Europe, North Africa and the 
Indian sub-continent - and from the poorest regions 
of these countries at that - to the richer countries of 
N.W. Europe. (Tables 2,  3.) 
The period from  1950  to  1970  was  one of unpre-
cedented  economic  growth  in  Western  Europe  -
Germany, France and Italy set the pace, followed by 
the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. Even the 
average  annual  economic  growth  rate  of the  UK 
(2 per cent - 3 per cent) was  high in relation to past 
experience.  Economies  grow  more  rapidly  if more 
workers can be put to work and/or for each worker 
more and better machinery is  made available. Exam-
ples can be given from all sectors of a modern indus-
trial economy of increased productivity resulting from 
mechanisation,  though  the  opportunities  for  intro-
ducing  new  techniques  more  obviously  exist  in  the 
manufacturing sector.  Growth is  therefore to a large 
degree related to (a) the additional numbers of  workers 
available  for  work,  and  (b)  to  the  proportion  of 
workers employed in the modern, high productivity, 
manufacturing sector. 
Economies do not grow to order,  but rather as a 
response to stimuli which create increased demand for 
the  output  of that  economy.  For example,  in  the 
1950s, international demand for German exports grew 
rapidly,  and this  increased  demand  stimulated  new 
investment in plant and equipment for export indus-
tries. Increased incomes in the same industries stimu-
lated demand for other goods and services as a result 
of these  increased  incomes.  The  'bonanza'  (at least 
in  theory),  should eventually  have  come  to an end, 
because of a shortage of labour or materials, and the 
consequent effect  of such supply problems.  In other 
words, the lack of  labour and materials would cause a 
bottleneck and slow down the rate of growth output. 
In fact,  one  of the  most  important features  which 
enabled growth to be sustained at such high levels in 
Germany, and indeed in Western Europe, was (and is) 
the availability of workers, either indigenous or immi-
grant, to supply the ever-growing demands of  industry. Table 2 
Immigrants in France, Germany, Switzerland and Britain by 
country of  origin (thousands)  1970 
Country  France  G'many  Switzer- Britain  Total 
of origin  land 
Irish 
Republic  1  739  740 
Poland  113  118  231 
Germany  43  116  142  301 
France  47  50  34  131 
Austria  3  143  43  30  219 
Nether-
lands  10  104  17  131 
Portugal  480  54  6  540 
Spain  617  246  98  35  996 
Italy  612  574  532  102  1,820 
Yugosl'via  52  515  21  13  601 
Greece  10  343  9  362 
Turkey  9  469  4  482 
Cyprus  60  60 
Tunisia  89  89 
Morocco  143  143 
Algeria  608  608 
Pakistan  75  75 
India  1  240  241 
Jamaica  152  152 
Other 
British 
W. Indies  117  117 
Others  386  482  112  710  1,690 
Total  3,177  2,977  972  2,603  9,729 
Source: Castles, S. and Kosack, G., op. cit. 
Note: Figures seldom take into account illegal immigrants, 
about  whom  it  is  obviously  difficult  to  obtain  data.  In 
Germany,  the  1970  estimate  of illegal  entrants  was  c. 
100,000. 
This situation is not of  itself a new phenomenon. In 
the  mid-nineteenth  century  Irishmen  and  women 
entered Britain to build the railways and to work in 
textile mills;  Polish workers were  employed in both 
the French and German coalmines at the tum of the 
century, as were the Italians in the building industry 
of  Southern Germany. Since 1950, however, the move-
ment of workers both within and into the countries of 
Western Europe has been on a very large scale. In the 
early  1950s  urban unemployed  within each country 
were  put to  work  and  concurrently  rural  workers 
were moving to the urban industrial centres for higher 
pay or because of  growing rural unemployment. By the 
end of  the 1950s and into the 1960s the shortfall in the 
supply of labour was being made up by the immigra-
tion of  workers from Southern Europe, North Mrica, 
and  the  ex-colonies  of  the  European  countries. 
Immigrant  workers  have  thus  been  important to the 
sustained economic growth of Western Europe, both by 
reason of their numbers and because of the jobs they 
have performed. (Table 4.) 
The  rapidly  growing  manufacturing  industry  re-
quired more workers and was prepared, or could be 
forced, to provide better pay and working conditions. 
Table 4 
Main Occupation of  Immigrant  Workers in France  ( 1968) 
-Germany (1969)  and Switzerland (1968) 
%  %  % 
France  Germany  Switzerland 
Male Female  Male Female  Male Female 
Agriculture  9·2  6·1  1·3  0·4  3·5  0·6 
Building  35·6  1·7  21·7  0·4  33·7  -
Engineering  13·5  6·7  32·8  17·6  23·5  9·5 
Clothing  0·8  6·8  5·9  18·2  1·6  15·8 
Domestic 
Service  0·5  28·8  3·0  10·5  0·4  10·8 
Indigenous workers thus moved out of  the traditional 
uncertain,  uncomfortable  and  relatively  low  paid 
employment in agriculture, mining and building, into 
modern manufacturing, and immigrants came in to fill 
the jobs left by these workers. This growth was to a 
degree self-sustaining - by projecting the trends of a 
successful recent past, an equally successful future was 
anticipated. This resulted in higher levels of  investment 
in new technologies and a higher level of  consumption 
from rising real incomes, which in tum ensured that a 
high rate of growth would be sustained. The crunch, 
if it was to come, would occur when this increase in 
demand for the economy's output could not be satis-
fied from domestic production due to labour shortages 
and was satisfied by increasing imports. By pulling in 
imports in excess  of exports, a  balance-of-payments 
crisis and/or inflation of prices would occur. This has 
been a  common occurrence in the United Kingdom 
since  1950  but relatively  less  important in most of 
Western Europe. 
Immigration  has  been  qualitatively  different  in 
various countries  of Western  Europe; its impact is 
most clearly seen in the three main groupings shown 
in the  Table  3  above.  Germany  and  France  have 
imported workers to staff building and civil engineer-
ing, heavy mechanical engineering, and services. The 
United Kingdom, although being a large importer of 
workers, has also been a large exporter, in particular 
to the white Commonwealth.! Even so, certain indus-
tries  and services  are substantially manned by mig-
rants, for example, night shift work in textile factories, 
public transport, many grades of the hospital service, 
and,  of course,  the  hotel  and  catering  trade.  In 
Switzerland large sections of the economy are depen-
dent  on  immigrant  workers;  clothing  and  textiles, 
rubber and plastics, metal, food and fodder industries, 
building, civil engineering, and hotel and catering. In 
these  sectors  over 50  per cent of all employees are 
immigrants. Reaction to this high level of  immigration 
has led to Swiss  restrictions on immigrants, forcing 
such firms as Brown-Boveri (a large electrical engin-
eering firm) to invest in West Germany because labour 
was not available. 
It is of interest to look at the impact of this immi-
t The 1arao  number of Irishmen who  man the building and civil  engineering 
industry are not usually considered as immigrants In the same way as would be 
West Indians or  Pakistanis, thouah in  fact they are the largest aroup of  Immigrants 
In the UK. gration on the main components of economic activity 
in both recipient and donor countries. 
Recipient Countries 
The  inflow  of such  large  numbers  of immigrant 
workers is important in its impact on most aspects of 
an economy. For the sake of clarity it is perhaps best 
to consider it in two  groupings,  one relating to the 
workers  and firms  (A),  and the  other,  (B),  to  the 
national economy as a whole. 
(A) Wage levels are supposedly set by the interaction 
of supply and demand - the more workers available 
the less is the upward pressure on wages, and vice versa. 
It might be expected that the influx of workers into 
Western Europe since 1950 would have resulted in the 
general wage level remaining relatively stable. In fact, 
wage  levels  have  considerably  increased  in  both 
absolute and real terms in each of the countries. This 
has been mainly due to the way  in which the work 
force  has  adjusted  to  the  developments  of modern 
manufacturing industry.  This  combines each worker 
with  more  and  better  capital  equipment,  which 
increases productivity. Over recent years, demand for 
goods produced has grown at a period when output 
for each employee has been increasing, and in a situa-
tion of buoyant demand the business  enterprise has 
been  able  to  keep  labour by  increasing  wages  and 
passing on any cost in excess of productivity improve-
ments  to the purchaser. 
As  previously  shown,  indigenous  workers  moved 
i~to  modem  manufacturing  industry,  tempted  by 
htgher pay and, in some. cases, less exacting working 
conditions,  and immigrant workers have filled  their 
places in traditional industries. This concentration has 
been further reinforced by (1) the movement of new 
indigenous  workers  into  skilled  white  collar profes-
sional jobs,  and  (2)  the  educational,  language  and 
social  barriers  which  confront  the  migrant  who 
attempts to move into more skilled  and better paid 
jobs. Immigrant workers with lower levels of expecta-
tion, coming from countries with much lower standards 
of living have,  therefore,  owing to their lower wage 
occupations, had an impact not on general wage levels 
but rather on the relative wage levels. There has thus 
been a development towards two labour markets: one 
for local and the other for immigrant workers. 
As far as the employer is  concerned, to the extent 
that wages are depressed by the availability of  migrant 
~or~ers,. profits can be. increased. This needs clarify-
Ing, In view of the previous argument that the impact 
of immigration has increased wage levels.  Employers 
in modern manufacturing industry have changed the 
productive relationships between workers and machi-
nery. New technology has increased the importance of 
ma~hinery relative to labour but equally the smaller 
proportion of labour required has to be more skilled. 
It is  also  relatively  better paid.  However,  the tradi-
tional  industries,  where  the  bulk  of the  migrant 
workers are concentrated, are still  relatively labour-
intensive, and thus wage levels do strongly interact on 
profit.  It is  relative  wage  levels  that  we  are  here 
considering, therefore,  not general wage levels. 
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Employers, of course, have other ways of  increasing 
profitability,  an  obvious  one  being  to increase  pro-
ductivity. Immigrant workers are likely to have both 
positive and negative effects on productivity. Workers 
who cannot speak the native language and are unused 
to local customs and methods of  work take some time 
a 'learning period', before they are able to reach  th~ 
peak of efficiency.2 This problem is aggravated if the 
workers have no experience of  modern industry. When 
they  are concentrated in low productivity industries 
such as building, there are only limited opportunities 
for increasing productivity, but if there are vacancies 
due to under-utilisation of  capacity in the manufactur-
ing sector (i.e. when plant is idle due to a shortage of 
workers),  the  contribution  of the  migrant  worker 
results in increased productivity. 
(B)  At the general economic level  the impact of 
immigrant workers  on inflation  and the  balance  of 
payments  needs  to  be  considered.  Inflation,  that is 
rising prices, is usually considered due to one or two 
main  causes;  excess  demand  in  relation  to  output 
(demand pull), and/or the effect of rising costs which 
are passed on in the form of higher prices (cost push). 
In order to put immigrants to work it is argued that 
additional  investment  in  plant  and  equipment  is 
required.  There  is  thus  an  increase  in  investment 
c.oncurrent with an increase  ~n. demand for consump-
tion  goods  due  to  the  additional  incomes  paid  to 
immigrants.  Now,  if this  were  the  case,  then  the 
impact  of immigrant  workers  would  certainly  be 
inflationary, for an imbalance would be created within 
the economy  between  the  production of investment 
and the consumption of goods.3 This would apply if 
there was no under-utilised capacity in the economy. 
/ If  there was such spare capacity, and it seems that this 
has  been  the  most  usual  case,  then,  as  has  been 
previously argued,  the new  workers help to increase 
productivity and not only  exert  little  cost push  on 
inflation but also reduce 'demand pull'. 
A variant of this argument reasons that immigrants 
are  inflationary  because  for  each  worker there  are 
say,  a  wife  and two  children  to  be  supported.  Th~ 
corollary  of this  is  that the dependent requires  the 
provision of housing, education and social facilities 
and,  because  these  are investment goods,  the effect 
would be similar to the provision of extra plant and 
equipment  for  immigrant  workers.  However  it  is  .  '  Important  to  note  that immigrant  workers  do  not 
usually bring dependents to live with them until late 
in the  migration  cycle,  and  are  thus  making  small 
claims on social facilities. This is evidenced by the fact 
that  the  recipient  countries  have  not  dramatically 
increased social expenditure as a result of  the inflow of 
immigrants. 
The balance of payments effects follows closely on 
from  the previous discussion.  Increased demand for 
consumer goods which cannot be met from domestic 
production  will,  as  an  alternative,  be  met  from 
imports. The immigrants' incomes, it is assumed, will 
be  spent partly on imports. The net effect  of immi-
2 Many  firms  orefer  to  recruit  from  one  nationality  to  minimise  language 
oroblems, and they grouo nationalities into blocks on assembly lines. 
3 Investment goods are considered to be inflationary because their oroduction 
generates incomes but not goods on which these incomes may be soent. grants  on  the  economy  is  reflected  in  the  balance 
between additional exports produced and sold due to 
their  presence,  and  the  additional  imports  they 
consume.  In  this  context  an  examination  of  the 
expenditure patterns of migrant workers is vital. 
They  send  a  relatively  high  proportion  of their 
income back to their families, which, of  course, reduces 
their capacity to spend but, in addition, being mainly 
in lower paid occupations, they spend a higher pro-
portion  of  their  incomes  on  housing  and  food. 
(Housing is  a  domestically  produced and consumed 
commodity in Western Europe, as are a high propor-
tion of staple foodstuffs. There is to be set against this 
the money that immigrants send back to their families 
at home. This represents a direct export of  capital, and, 
depending on its magnitude, can be seen as the single 
most  important  negative  effect  on  the  recipient 
countries'  balance  of payments.  If the  workers  are 
eventually joined by their families, the repatriation of 
incomes  is  either  stopped  or  reduced,  of course. 
Figures are difficult to obtain but Table 5 shows the 
currency  drain  from  immigrant  workers  in  West 
Germany. 
Table 5 
The  Currency  Drain from  Gastarbeiter  Compared 
with Net Outflow of Tourist Funds  (1970) 
to  000 million DM  Net tourist outflow 
000 million DM 
Italy  1,250  1,347 
Greece  550  66 
Spain  500  612 
Turkey  900  56 
Yugoslavia  1,000  428 
Total  4,200  2,509 
Donor Countries 
Healthy young workers, possibly skilled, are for all 
countries, and particularly poor countries, a valuable 
economic  resource.  The  main  donor countries  have 
severe problems of economic underdevelopment and 
at least superficially should use all their resources to 
improve their economies and living standards. Given 
this,  the  outflow  of these  workers  is  an  economic 
catastrophe. In reality, however, most of  these workers 
are  either  unemployed  or  under-employed  in  their 
own countries. Nevertheless, although in the short run 
migration is  not a disaster,  its long term effects can 
still  be  very severe,  for owing to the type of people 
who are likely to emigrate the structure of population 
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in the donor country is  obviously changed. The pro-
portion of young men of working age  decreases and 
the proportion of  dependents (old people and children) 
increases.  In  such  a  situation,  where  there  is  an 
increase  in dependents for  each economically  active 
person to support, the problems of development are 
obviously exacerbated. 
Two main arguments have to be set against this, (1) 
the acquisition of new  skills by the workers and, (2) 
the  inflow  of currency  due  to  their  repatriation  of 
income. The poorer countries are seeking to improve 
living standards by increasing the strength of  their own 
economies,  and  this  usually  demands  increased 
mechanisation and the introduction of new technolo-
gies  which  are  more  commonly  used  in  Western 
Europe.  Their  labour force  is  experienced  in  tradi-
tional skills and crafts, but lacks experience in modern 
manufacturing industry. Workers who have acquired 
this experience  in Western Europe often return and 
put it to  use  in  the  new  plants  within  their  own 
countries and also pass these skills on to their fellow-
workers.  The  second  benefit  is  that  remittances  of 
incomes are a tangible benefit to the donor country, 
the  more  so  since  they  are  in  comparatively  hard 
currencies.  Lack  of foreign  exchange  is  a  serious 
problem for poorer countries. 
Conclusion 
At the beginning it was suggested that an economic 
analysis would help to assess  the role of immigrants 
in Western Europe more objectively.  The economist 
cannot, however,  help his  reader to escape social  or 
political judgement. He can show that immigrants have 
played  a  significant  part in  the  development  of the 
Western  European economies  and that their  native 
countries  have  received  some  benefits  from  this 
emigration.  In the  long  term,  after  the  social  and 
political considerations have been allowed for,  there 
should be general agreement that the recent economic 
performance  of  Western  Europe  would  be  less 
impressive without the contribution of  the immigrants. 
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I MIGRANT WORKERS  -foreign workers in countries of the EEC  Table 3 
Key to boxes  ., 
' 
Number of established 
immigrant workers, and 
their nationalities, Jan.1973 
2  Number of workers who 
immigrated to the EEC 
during 1971 
3  Number and destination 
of the majority of those 
workers during 1971 
}  elsewhere in  EEC 
Source: Sunday Times/EEC  Coordination Office European Studies, 18,1974 
Energy in the EEC 
John Bradbeer 
Energy  is  one  of the  fundamental  requirements  of any  advanced  industrial 
economy,  and its supply has become a large  and complex area of  economic activity. 
For about a year or so, there has been an  increasing awareness of  a worldwide energy 
crisis, made more apparent by the Middle Eastern situation in late 1973.  The energy 
crisis contains many elements: short-term  worries about the scarcity of  supply of  oil 
and its price, the availability and cost of  substitutes, and in the longer-term, the supply 
of  energy to meet future demands,  and the threats posed by consequent pollution. 
Introduction 
During  the  post-war  period  there  has  been  a 
dramatic increase in world energy consumption, with 
an annual growth rate of  around 5 per cent being sus-
tained. This has led  to a doubling of demand every 
15  years,  and  the  nine  members  of the  European 
Economic  Community  have  themselves  experienced 
such rates of  growth. In 1972 this energy consumption 
of  1,260  million  tons  coal  equivalent  (t.c.e.)  was 
about 16 per cent of the world total and represented a 
per  capita  consumption  of 4,950  kilogrammes  coal 
equivalent - about two and a half times greater than 
the  world  average.  Prior  to  the  energy  crisis,  the 
EEC accepted that its energy demand would continue 
to rise at 4.7 per cent per annum until1985, to give a 
consumption  of 2,575  million  t.c.e.  in  that  year. 
Energy  forecasting  is  a  difficult  task,  however,  and 
projections  of existing  trends  do  not always  prove 
justified. Gladstone in his budget speech of 1863 fore-
cast Britain's energy consumption a century hence as 
3,000  million  t.c.e.,  a  figure  well  over  twice  that 
actually attained in 1972! 
About  three-quarters  of Europe's  energy  is  con-
sumed by industry and the domestic sector.  In 1972 
industry used some 486 million t.c.e. and the domestic 
sector only 4 million t.c.e. less. Transport is the third 
largest consumer, accounting for almost 15 per cent of 
the  total,  whilst  the  remaining  187  million  t.c.e.  of 
primary energy is  converted into secondary sources, 
such as thermal electricity and manufactured town gas. 
The total per capita energy consumption for each 
country shows relatively little variation from the EEC 
average.  However,  as  seen  in  Table  1  below,  the 
individual  countries  exhibit  more  diversity  in their 
sources  of primary energy.  Oil  is  the  Community's 
largest  source  of energy,  as  it is  for  each  member 
country except Luxembourg. In Denmark and Italy, it 
totally  dominates  the  energy  economy.  Coal  is  the 
second energy source of  the EEC and is so everywhere, 
except in the Netherlands and Italy where natural gas 
fills this place, and in Ireland where peat is of  import-
ance. Natural gas is of  some importance and its use is 
developing, especially in the Benelux countries and the 
United  Kingdom.  Primary  electricity,  nuclear,  and 
hydro power, is  of limited importance, even being a 
net consumer of  energy in Belgium, Denmark and the 
Netherlands. 
The EEC thus has an oil dominated economy, with 
coal,  and  increasingly,  natural  gas,  making  up  the 
remaining energy. Whilst Belgium,  France and West 
Germany  conform  closely  to  this  pattern,  Italy, 
Table 1 
Primary Energy in the EEC- 1972 
Total  Per 
Consumption  Capita 
(million  (kg.t.c.e.)  Oil  Coal  Natural  Lignite  Primary 
tonnes coal  Gas  &Peat  Electricity 
equivalent) 
Belgium  63.2  6,504  60.4  26.1  13.7  - -0.2 
Denmark  27.9  5,581  95.3  7.0  - - -2.3 
France  235.2  4,568  67.3  17.2  7.1  0.6  7.8 
West 
Germany  355.1  5,757  55.2  23.8  8.8  8.7  3.1 
Ireland  10.3  3,422  69.0  10.5  - 18.5  2.0 
Italy  173.1  3,189  73.9  6.4  10.6  0.2  8.7 
Luxembourg  6.8  19,594  31.0  52.9  2.2  - 13.3 
Netherlands  82.5  6,191  49.6  5.2  45.6  - -0.5 
United 
Kingdom  306.6  5,496  49.8  35.1  11.1  - 4.1 
EEC  1,260.3  4,950  59.5  21.5  11.6  2.8  4.5 
Source: EEC Energy Statistics 1973 
1 Denmark and Ireland rely  especially  heavily  on oil, 
but the  United  Kingdom  with  its  coal  and natural 
gas,  and  the  Netherlands  with  natural  gas,  are 
rather special cases.  As a whole the EEC relies  on a 
little over  60  per cent of its  energy being imported, 
but whilst the United Kingdom and the Netherlands 
manage to meet half of their requirements domestic-
ally,  most of the  other countries  require over three-
quarters  of their  energy  to  be  imported.  Thus  any 
trends in the world energy market will most certainly 
be felt  in Europe,  but their impact will  differ  from 
country  to  country,  and  the  exact  energy  mix  will 
reflect the changing relative costs of energy sources. 
Oil 
Oil  has  rapidly  come  to  dominate  the  world's 
energy economy as  coal did before it.  About 45  per 
cent of the world's energy supply is  met by  oil,  but 
unlike coal, the EEC has very limited domestic sources 
of oil.  Oil, until about 1970, had been both relatively 
abundant and cheap.  It is  now a  much scarcer and 
costlier commodity and will become even more so in 
the future. 
During the  1950s and early 1960s oil was in over-
supply, with major oil fields  in the Middle East and 
North  Africa  being  discovered  and  exploited.  Oil 
prices fell  relative to other costs and oil  made great 
inroads into coal's market, as well as meeting much of 
the growth in energy demand.  In the early  1960s  oil 
began to fulfil about half of the EEC's energy require-
ments, replacing coal as the major fuel.  From the late 
1960s  oil  moved into a position of relative shortage. 
The United States became, quite rapidly, a major oil 
importer  with  almost  12  per  cent  of its  oil  being 
imported  in  1972.  Oil  had  proved  such  a  potent 
competitor that western  Europe's  coal  industry  had 
declined far faster than anticipated, and with nuclear 
power  programmes  running  into  delays,  energy 
demands could only be met by oil, and when the pres-
sure on oil supply became heavy, an oil shortage began 
to appear. 
In this changing market, a major element has been 
the emergence, as a powerful cartel, of the Organisa-
tion  of  Petroleum  Exporting  Countries  (OPEC).l 
Formed  in  1960,  OPEC  has  become  effective  only 
since  1969.  Its members control just over half of the 
world's production (or almost 80 per cent of produc-
tion outside the USA and USSR), and almost three-
quarters  of the  world's  currently  known  reserves. 
Europe draws almost 90 per cent of its oil from the 
OPEC members.  OPEC has  made two  demands  on 
the oil companies and users, the first for higher prices 
and  taxes,  and  the  second  for  greater control  over 
operations in  member  countries.  Between  1970  and 
mid-1973 oil prices rose by around 70 per cent, but in 
the few months after October 1973, prices more than 
quadrupled,  and  Saudi  Arabian  oil  which  early  in 
1973  cost  $11.17  per  tonne,  now  costs  $51.47  per 
tonne. These price rises will cost the United Kingdom 
alone a further £1,800  million for oil imports.  After 
the  Middle  Eastern  war  of 1973,  the  Arab  oil  pro-
1 Members of OPEC are Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, 
Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. 
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ducers used the 'oil weapon' and cut back production 
by  15-20  per cent. This produced immediate  short-
ages, but the oil companies re-routed supplies and the 
cut-back has been much relaxed, leaving price as the 
chief oil  problem.  OPEC, no doubt, will continue to 
make further  demands,  and  the cartel  has a  strong 
position. During the 1980s alternative energy sources 
will  probably temper  OPEC's power  and the cartel 
could then break up.  In the meantime,  however,  the 
EEC and other importers  will  have  to learn to live 
with OPEC. 
Europe produced only  12  million  tonnes  of oil in 
1972,  and less  than the previous year.  This is only a 
minute  amount of oil  in terms  of demand,  but the 
situation will  change in the next decade.  The North 
Sea is  one of the world's major petroliferous basins. 
(See  Tables  2.)  Since  1969,  when  the  Ekofisk  field 
was  found  in  the  Norwegian  sector,  some  1,600 
million tonnes of oil  have  been found  in the British 
sector alone. The oil is the subject of political debate 
at present,  but could  probably meet  15  per cent  of 
Britain's oil demands by the early 1980s and probably 
almost all  later in the decade.  However,  only about 
a third of  Europe's oil needs will eventually come from 
the North Sea, and the oil is rather light, yielding less 
heavy fuel oil than other crudes, and will cost between 
ten and twenty times as  much as  Middle Eastern oil 
to  produce.  It will,  however,  be  safe  and  close  to 
centres  of demand,  and  hence  fully  competitive  in 
European markets. 
The long-term prospects for  oil  are  not bright.  It 
is a question of  when, rather than whether, oil reserves 
become exhausted, for quite simply, demand is infinite 
and reserves finite.  During this decade more oil  will 
be consumed than in an previous years put together, 
and existing reserves  will  last for a very  short time. 
Chronic depletion  of oil  reserves  will  thus probably 
take place in the early part of the next century. 
Coal 
Coal has declined rapidly from a dominant position 
in the energy economy. As late as 1964 in the original 
six  members and 1971  in Britain, coal was  the chief 
energy source. Coal production in the EEC has been 
falling at around 7 per cent per annum since the late 
1960s.  Rising  costs  and  competition  from  oil  have 
been the chief causes of coal's demise.  However,  the 
recent surge in oil prices has made coal an attractive 
proposition  again,  and  Europe  contains  large  re-
serves  - some  90,000  to  100,000  million  tonnes,  or 
enough to sustain all current energy needs for almost 
75 years.  (Britain has a high  proportion of Europe's 
coal reserves and recently a further 500 million tonnes 
were  discovered  at Selby  in Yorkshire,  and an even 
larger basin is known at depth beneath North Oxford-
shire,  perhaps  containing as  much  as  5,000  million 
tonnes). 
Coal  has  declined  in  all  member  countries  and 
government efforts have largely consisted of attempts 
to control the rate of run-down.  American coal can 
still undercut European coal in many places, and the 
EEC's  largest  coal  industry,  that  of Britain,  has 
suffered from labour problems, and in 1972 had debts of £400 million written off. There is some doubt about 
the  ability  of Europe's coal industry  to respond  to 
increased  energy  demand  without  massive  new  in-
vestment.  Broadly speaking,  though,  coal will  prob-
ably be able to meet a slightly greater share of  Europe's 
energy  needs  than  expected,  owing  to  the  rise  in 
energy  costs.  (See  Table  3.)  Problems  of  mining 
and waste  disposal will  have  to be  considered if the 
environment is  not to  be  further  despoiled  by  the 
industry, however. 
Natural Gas 
Natural  gas  has  done  much  to  alter  Europe's 
dependence on imported energy.  Gas was first found 
in large quantities in Groningen in the Netherlands in 
1959 and during the 1960s the North Sea has yielded 
several  gas  fields.  Some  natural  gas  is  imported  in 
liquified form (mainly from Algeria) but as yet there 
is no major international trade in gas, and Europe has 
to meet its own requirements. 
The distribution of natural gas reserves is shown in 
Table 4 
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On-shore 
Netherlands  2,250  2,750  150 
Germany  400  650  40 
Italy & France  300  450  40 
OtT-shore 
Southern North Sea  1,250  2,500  125 
Middle North Sea  750  1,580?  90 
Northern North Sea  - 1,580?  90? 
4,950  9,350  445 
Source: Adapted from P. Odell (1973),  Indigenous oil and gas 
developments  and  Western  Europe's  energy  policy  options. 
Energy Studies 1. pp.47-64. 
Table  4.  The  bulk  of existing  reserves  lie  onshore 
in  the  Netherlands  and  by  1980  could  perhaps 
meet a little under 10  per cent of the EEC's energy 
requirements. The North Sea gas finds  (Table 2)  are 
rather  more  difficult  to  evaluate.  Although  it  is 
probable in time that their reserves will exceed those 
on-shore,  development  will  depend  on  rates  of oil 
production, as natural gas in the northern part of the 
North Sea  is  usually  found  in  association  with  oil, 
unlike  the  southern  part where  gas  is  found  alone. 
The rate of exploration has slackened in the British 
sector after the initial burst, and one of the factors in 
this has been the pricing policy for the gas adopted in 
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Britain.2  However,  by  1980, the  British  sector  alone 
could be  supplying enough gas- to meet the existing 
total energy needs of Italy.  On-shore gas  reserves in 
France, West Germany and Italy are quite small and 
will  play a lesser part in  the economy of the energy 
market. 
Developments  in  the  Mediterranean  and  in  the 
Celtic Sea could well add further to Europe's natural 
gas  reserves,  and this very  useful  energy  source will 
become more important, perhaps  exceeding  the  15-
20 per cent share of the energy market allocated to it 
for  1985.  In the longer term,  of course,  natural gas 
reserves,  like  oil,  will  be  depleted  to  the  point  of 
exhaustion. 
Nuclear Energy 
Nuclear energy  at present represents  a very  small 
proportion of the EEC's total energy economy, for it 
meets only a little over 1 per cent of primary energy 
consumption.  It represents  around  5. 7  per  cent  of 
electricity generated, although in the United Kingdom 
10.5  per  cent  of electricity  is  generated  by  nuclear 
stations.  However,  Europe  is  one  of the  world's 
major centres of nuclear research, and nuclear energy 
will certainly be called on to meet the bulk of energy 
requirements in future. 
Through the Euratom agreement,  the  six  founder 
members  of the EEC began a nuclear research pro-
gramme, with independent national programmes and 
American reactors either bought or built under licence. 
Only Luxembourg, Ireland and Denmark are without 
nuclear power stations. However, nuclear engineering 
is very demanding and costly, and although Britain's 
programme  is  furthest  advanced,  it  has  run  into 
difficulties.  The earliest type of reactors, if costly to 
build, are successfully working, but the second genera-
tion (the advanced gas cooled reactor (AGR) has been 
seriously  delayed and no new  power stations of this 
type will be ordered. To meet increased demands the 
Central Electricity Generating Board proposes to buy 
American light-water reactors (LWR's). This decision 
has  not yet  been confirmed  and is  being fought  on 
technical and safety  grounds but could be a  serious 
setback to a European nuclear programme. 
Future nuclear power stations, it is  hoped, will  be 
of the fast-breeder reactor type (FBR), which actually 
produce  more  plutonium  than  they  use.  However, 
only prototypes exist (the British one is at Dounreay 
in Scotland), and no power stations of  this kind will be 
generating  until  the  mid-1980s  at  the  earliest.  The 
FBR would vastly extend existing uranium reserves, 
for which Europe has been largely dependent on the 
USA,  and  this  would  give  it  added  attractiveness. 
Further research in nuclear power will  probably  be 
into nuclear fission,  rather than fusion, as at present, 
but the problems of safety in nuclear engineering will 
dominate the research programme for some time yet. 
Not until the end of the century will  nuclear energy 
become  a  major energy  source,  by  which  time  the 
problems of radio-active waste disposal will be acute. 
2 The British Gas Corporation has monopoly purchasing rights, and the price 
it has fixed for buying natural gas is about half that obtained in other parts of 
Europe. Other sources of Energy 
Both for the present and foreseeable  future,  coal, 
oil, natural gas and nuclear energy are Europe's chief 
energy  sources.  Although  other  sources  such  as 
hydro-electricity,  geothermal  power,  tidal  and solar 
energy  exist,  they  are  either limited  in  potential  or 
pose problems of utilisation, and make only a small 
contribution to meeting demand at present. 
Hydro-electricity meets only about 3 per cent of the 
EEC's energy requirements, and the bulk of develop-
ment is found in Italy and France. Shortage of  suitable 
sites makes further expansion unlikely and its relative 
importance  will  decline.  Pumped  storage  schemes, 
where surplus electricity is  used to pump water into 
storage lakes and the water, when released, flows  out 
through  turbines  generating  electricity,  will  become 
more important as  more electricity is  produced, and 
will be used in conjunction with major power stations, 
as at Trawsfynydd in Wales. 
Geothermal energy is currently used only in Italy, 
where  it generates  a  little  under 2  per cent  of the 
electricity,  mainly in Tuscany,  but potential is fairly 
limited  and  geothermal  energy  will  never  make  a 
major  contribution  to  Europe's  energy  resources. 
Tidal  power  has  been  utilised  only  on  the  Rance 
estuary in France, where a 240 Mw station has been 
built. A number of other possible sites exist in north 
west  France  and  western  Britain  but there  are  no 
development  plans  for  the  immediate  future.  Solar 
energy remains the largest potential source of energy 
in Europe but serious problems have to be solved if it 
is to be effectively used. 
Energy Policy 
Since  its  formation,  the  EEC  has  made  some 
efforts towards establishing an energy policy, but the 
changing world energy market and the membership of 
three  new  states  in  1973  has  not  helped  progress. 
Difficulties  are  further  compounded  because  (1) 
control  of the  energy  industries  is  in  the  hands  of 
many  bodies,  both  private  and  state  owned,  and 
national interests are often deeply involved,  and (2), 
there are several goals for energy policy, and reconciling 
these  and  other  conflicting  interests  is  especially 
difficult. 
Since  its formation,  the European Coal and Steel 
Community sought to implement common goals for 
the coal industries of its members. As coal's position 
in the energy economy declined, problems associated 
with  its  falling  output  became  important,  but also 
overall control of the energy economy became more 
difficult to attain. In 1964 deliberations began on the 
evolution  of a  Community  energy  problem  and in 
1968  'First  Guidelines  for  a  Community  Energy 
Policy'  appeared as  the basis  of policy  for the sub-
sequent  fifteen  years.  Energy  sources  were  to  be 
secure and low cost and gradually policies of members 
were  to  be  harmonised.  The  advent  of  Britain, 
presently a major coal, and in future an oil producer, 
as a member, obviously altered the pattern. 
In most of the member countries, the majority of 
the energy industries,  especially  coal  and electricity, 
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are under state control. However, cooperation between 
such state bodies has been small, and control of the 
major energy source, oil, lies outside Europe. Although 
France,  Italy and Britain  have  state interests in oil 
companies, and the Dutch and British, through Shell, 
have  a  major  oil  company,  American  based  multi-
national  corporations  dominate  the  oil  industry  in 
Europe.  Evolution  and  implementation  of energy 
policies,  even  witbin  individual  co•trles, has  there-
fore been a complex and as yet relatively unsuccessful 
process. 
The  rapid expansion  of demand for  oil,  whilst  it 
offered  cheap  energy,  threatened  the  viability  of 
domestic  coal  industries.  Some  countries,  especially 
Britain, tried to temper the competitive edge of oil by 
a  special  tax, whilst the Dutch have  planned to run 
down  their industry and assist  the  mining  areas  of 
Limburg.  At the same time,  imported energy is not 
secure, as the events of 1973 have shown, and with the 
effective ending of  cheap energy, new policy directions 
wilt have to be found. 
Development  of  existing  indigenous  sources  of 
energy, especially coal and North Sea oil and gas, will 
be stepped up,  and renewed efforts made in nuclear 
research.  As  important,  however,  will  be  efforts  to 
economise and increase the efficiency of energy use, and 
transport policy,  to take one instance,  will  certainly 
reflect a considerable shift of emphasis in this decade. 
By  a concerted attempt to conserve energy,  existing 
energy resources can last far longer, and the threat of 
pollution by waste heat, gases, and solid wastes, will 
cause more rational approach to energy use.  As yet, 
no such energy policy has evolved, although these are 
all recognised as key issues. 
Europe's energy problems are thus many and com-
plex.  In the medium- to long-term,  oil  will  lose  its 
dominant position and eventually nuclear energy will 
replace it. The evolution of policies to see the change 
through will  be  difficult,  but with newly  discovered 
oil and natural gas reserves as well as coal, Europe is 
at least in a far better position to make the transition 
than ten years ago. In the longer term, environmental 
problems,  both large and small  scale,  posed by the 
vastly increased energy consumption will have to be 
faced.  Their  solution  will  likely  prove  far  more 
difficult than today's period of energy shortage. 
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In  1973 Britain burned 132m tons  of coal, but this accounted 
for less than 39% of our total energy requirements. Oil reached 
the equivalent of 158m tons of coal  and  even  natural gas was 
up to 40m tons. But coal's long decline could be over. Subject 
to many uncertainties, about oil prices, nuclear performance, and 
the pace  of North Sea  development and  our economic growth 
rate, the chart shows two possibilities for 1980, A and B giving 
room for 11Om - 140m tons of coal  a year. 
Source: Sunday Times  February 24th  1974. 
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Shop-Floor Trade Unionism 
in Western Europe 
Anthony Carew 
The Shop Steward is one of  this country's best known institutions, even though large numbers of 
people are ignorant of  his real function.  This ignorance has been compounded by a long-standing press 
campaign in  which  the shop steward is presented as the personification of  all that is irresponsible in 
British Trade Unionism.  Furthermore, to the extent that unfavourable comparisons are drawn between 
our own unions and those of  various western European countries, it is very often the British shop steward 
system that is held up as the source of  trouble. 
These  international comparisons are  usually very  crude  and fail to get down  to the real issue. 
Contrasts between our allegedly archaic system of  shop-floor industrial relations and the harmony of 
factory life elsewhere only tell us something if  that orderliness and harmony is genuine, lasting, and is 
shown to be attributable to the absence of  powerful shop stewards or their equivalent. However, as other 
countries are gradually discovering,  the question is not whether there should be in-plant trade union 
representatives, but rather what form of  democratic trade union representation employers will inevitably 
be forced to accept. 
Britain 
The British shop steward system has traditionally had much 
to do with democracy and direct control by workers over their 
immediate  working  environment.  We  should  consider  the 
development  of this  system  before  looking  at the shop-floor 
situation elsewhere. 
The British trade union movement  had reached a  stage of 
institutional  maturity  by  the  second-half  of the  nineteenth 
century.  But  even  as  this  form  hardened  into  a  permanent 
system,  the  conditions  in  which  the  unions  operated  were 
changing  in  a  way  that  highlighted  the  inadequacies  of the 
existing  institutional  form.  The  unions  had become  national 
bodies, and for the first time there emerged union bureaucracies. 
Hitherto they had been locally based or were small enough to 
manage their affairs  without professional administrators. The 
system  was  more  directly  democratic.  Head  office  functions 
alternated  among  different  branches;  policy  proposals  were 
initiated at the base without being filtered by the leaders; and 
decisions were taken by referendum. With the growing size of 
membership,  decision-making  by  representative  bodies  began 
to be used. However, the parliamentary concept of representa-
tive democracy has never ousted the more immediately demo-
cratic  notion  of  decision-making  by  delegate  meetings  in 
British  unions.l  (The  present  engineering  union,  AUEW, 
provides a living example of government by delegate bodies). 
Thus a certain amount of local control was  being removed 
from the rank and file. This was accentuated in the last decades 
of the nineteenth century and the early years  of this  century 
when  the  system  of district  level  settlement  of wages  and 
conditions started to erode. The challenge came with the rapid 
introduction  of piece  work  which,  because  standards  were 
unilaterally set by employers at the place of work, shifted the 
emphasis  to the shop-floor level  and left the union with  very 
little voice.  Later still, district wage and condition settling was 
challenged when national employers' federations were formed, 
making  it  possible  for  labour/management  dealings  to  take 
place on a national level. 
By the 1890s shop stewards had emerged as a rank and file 
response to the spread of piece work which  was  undermining 
union influence  over  established rates  of pay and conditions. 
They  had arrived,  in most cases,  far in  advance of any  con-
stitutional  provision  for  them  in  union  rules.  However,  the 
development  of  national  labour/management  negotiations 
1 The essence of a  delegate meeting involves  the mandating of participants to 
vote according to the wishes of their constituents. 
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increased their importance, for national negotiations can only 
deal in broad issues and there is an inevitable tendencyforthem to 
become divorced from the situation as it is experienced on the 
shop-floor. The shop stewards' task has always been to represent 
their members' interests by improving on nationally negotiated 
terms and conditions at the shop-floor level,  obtaining agree-
ment on matters that are otherwise unregulated, and providing 
an immediate defence of the gains already won by the unions. 
Though shop stewards were long denied official  recognition 
or approval by many unions, their importance has always been 
accepted at the base.  Indeed they are a spontaneous creation 
of this level  where  the union often is just 'the shop steward'. 
The main point to note, therefore, is that shop stewards emerged 
to fill a necessary function within the unions when the 'primitive', 
direct  democracy  of the  early  unions  ceased.  In the  shop 
stewards, with their direct election, their immediate accounta-
bility  at the place of work,  their power to obtain immediate 
redress  of grievances  without  recourse  to  long,  bureaucratic 
procedures,  we  find  an  attempt  to  preserve  an  important 
element of traditional direct democracy in unions. At present 
there  are  between  300-350,000  of them,  representing  some 
10  million  British  trade  unionists,  an intense  form  of local 
democracy  with  approximately  one  shop  steward  to  every 
30 union members. 
In contrasting the British system with the position elsewhere 
we need to consider a number of points. Firstly, how extensive 
and entrenched is  shop-floor union representation? Secondly, 
how much power do these people have to negotiate for their 
members and resolve problems at their point of  origin? (Effective 
negotiation  of this  type  necessitates  the  right  to  initiate  in-
dustrial  action).  Thirdly,  how  democratic  is  the  process  of 
selecting them? And lastly,  what is  their formal status within 
their union? 
Germany 
Perhaps the single most important element in understanding 
the present position with regard to shop-floor trade unionism 
in Germany is the fact that after the war the labour movement 
was rebuilt from  above. The institutional structure was  largely 
devised by occupying forces and the central organs were estab-
lished first. In other words, the national trade unions in post-
war Germany are not the final product of a natural process of a 
growth  upwards from  the base.  Rather,  they  are constructed 
from the top downwards and shop-floor bodies have always been 
totally dependent on the upper levels of the union hierarchy. The main form of in-plant worker representation in Germany 
is the works council, though this is not a union body as such. 
Works councils  were  established  under  a  law  of 1952,  the 
members being elected by the entire work force of a  factory, 
whether unionised or not. Nevertheless, the unions take great 
pains to see that their members are elected, and 90 per cent of 
the works council members are in fact proposed by the unions. 
The works council is  an institution of 'social partnership'. 
It must represent the interests of all workers and a  conscious 
eft'ort  Is  made  to ensure  tbat the  council  is  distinct from  the 
union. Economic information received by the works councillors 
is regarded as confidential and must not be passed on to the 
union. Council members are forbidden to call or lead strikes 
and in the event that a  strike does take place the councillors 
who are union members usually resign from the works council 
to protect themselves.  Unofficial  strikes in Germany are any 
way illegal, and strikers can be liable for losses sustained by the 
employer. 
Within the plant it is the works council members who have 
the  highest  status.  In large  plants  one council  member  for 
approximately every  1,000 workers will  be allowed to devote 
himself full-time to his council work on full pay. These are the 
only people who are released from work. Works councils have 
the right to negotiate with management over a limited range of 
issues so long as these have not been covered in a  collective 
agreement  at a  higher  level.  The  negotiable  items  include: 
plant  rules,  pay  structures,  and  piece  rates.  On  personnel 
matters such  as  hiring and firing,  and questions  relating to 
plant re-location,  the works council has the right to be con-
sulted. However, there is very little plant bargaining in Germany 
of the type that takes place in this country. All major collective 
bargaining is at the national or regional level, and in the past 
the employers have often had a fairly free hand to adjust plant 
conditions unilaterally. 
All  of this  has  meant  that plant level  union  activity  has 
tended to be of secondary importance and consequently there 
has been a widening gulf between the rank and file  and union 
leadership. To stem this trend the unions have introduced a 
body of'confidence men' (der Vertrauensmann) at the plant level. 
These are union activists who are given the job of liaising with 
the works council and trying to cement the links between the 
membership and the hierarchy. Between a  quarter and a  half 
of them are also works council members. This makes it difficult 
to identify the work of the 'confidence men'. They have, more-
over, an obligation to assist the works council in its activities, a 
clear indication of their subordinate status. 
'Confidence  men'  have  been  growing  in number  over  the 
past few  years,  and they have been recognised  in a  national 
collective agreement since 1969. In the better organised sectors 
of industry there is  one 'confidence man' to,  roughly,  every 
15 union members, but this ratio can vary widely from factory 
to factory.  Sometimes  they  are elected  but usually  they  are 
appointed by the local union for a three-year term. During this 
term the union can remove them from office if it wishes. They 
have no official functions or status in the plant, they are not 
allowed time off  from work with pay to  engage in union activities, 
and no special facilities, such as office space, are provided for 
them.  However,  there is  a  growing tendency for them to be 
granted protection from victimisation arising from their union 
work.  As far as employers are concerned their activities  are 
regarded as an internal union matter. For the most part they 
merely serve as dues collectors or as a channel for information 
to and from  the members and leadership.  They can pass on 
grievances  to  the  works  council  members  but they  are not 
allowed to take these up themselves with management. 
There  are indications  that this  attempt  by  the  unions  to 
strengthen their influence amongst the workshop membership 
has not been altogether successful. In recent years, when plant 
level strikes have taken place (and these are becoming increas-
ingly more frequent),  the workers have looked to the works 
councillors  for  leadership  rather  than  to  the  unions'  own 
appointees among the 'confidence men' - and this in spite of 
the fact that the works councillors are members of  an essentially 
non-union body. Clearly, German workers in the factories are 
becoming  more militant,  though  as  yet  they  have  no  local 
union institution of their own creation and under their own 
immediate control through which this militancy can be directed. 
2 
Belgium 
In a  number of respects  the Belgian  union situation more 
closely  resembles  that of this country than anywhere else  in 
Europe. The trade unions are numerically strong, with about 
two-thirds of the work force organised, and the unions have 
had a strong physical presence on the shop-floor, especially in 
the  post-war  years.  In the  most  important  sectors  such  as 
engineering,  chemicals,  mining and petroleum, almost 90  per 
cent  of manual  workers  are organised.  The Belgian  labour 
movement has a long standing tradition of  militancy. Industrial 
relations are conducted in a non-legalistic fashion, there being 
no laws governing the conduct of union/management dealings. 
There are three institutionalised forms of  union representation 
in the plants - the  union  delegation, the works councils and 
the safety and health committee. To some extent these three 
bodies share the work of representing the workers since there 
is a great deal of overlapping, both in terms of  jurisdiction and 
of membership. The works council, with half of its members 
proposed by the unions and elected from the shop-floor, has 
basically a consultative and advisory role on matters of econo-
mic and social policy, but is responsible for drawing up work-
shop rules. The more important body is the union delegation. 
These exist in most medium and large unionised plants under 
the terms of a national agreement signed in 1947.2 The principle 
of  a union presence on the plant was something that the employ-
ers  were  morally  forced  to concede at the end of the  war, 
given the leading role that the unions had played in war-time 
resistance, and the esteem in which they were popularly held. 
There is still no legal obligation on the employers to recognise 
a delegation, and the matter may well be resolved by a test of 
strength. Delegations are only permitted under the 194 7 agree-
ment in establishments employing 50 or more workers, and the 
size of the delegation depends on the number of workers; it 
can range from two to a maximum of 21. But about 36 per cent 
of Belgian workers are in plants with less than 50 workers and 
they therefore have no in-plant representation. In a well organ-
ised sector the socialist metalworkers have about 1,000 dele-
gates, i.e. about one delegate per 150 workers. 
These  representatives  enjoy  a  degree  of protection  from 
victimisation and, although they can be fired, actual separation 
from employment must be deferred until a joint labour/manage-
ment commission has investigated the case. A certain number of 
hours are set aside for the delegation to attend to union business 
without loss of pay. At the moment this ranges from 20-680 per 
month, depending on the size of the work force. Factories with 
7,000 or more workers allow 680 hours to the delegation, which 
means  three or four delegates  can work  full-time  on union 
business.  But this  is  a  contentious area and the  unions  are 
pressing for more paid time off. 
Members  of the  delegation  can  be  elected  by  the  union 
members every four years, but more frequently they are appointed 
by the full-time union officers.  The delegates  are responsible 
for taking up individual and collective agreements and negotiat-
ing over matters of wages  and conditions that have not been 
settled by collective bargaining at a  higher level. This permits 
a certain amount of shop bargaining on things like piece rates 
and wage grades, while ruling out negotiations at this level over 
general wage increases. There is thus a constraint on plant level 
negotiations, but it is not insurmountable and in situations where 
the rank and file are strong, better rates of pay and conditions 
can be negotiated in the plant. 
Since  the early  1960s  the Belgian  union&  have accepted  a 
system of multi-industry bargaining at the level of the national 
economy, with the detailed terms and conditions subsequently 
negotiated within each industry.  With this system the unions 
have accepted the need for a 'no strike' commitment during the 
length of the fixed  period agreements.  In recent years agree-
ments have lasted as long as five years and, although there is no 
legal obligation to keep industrial peace, this moral commitment 
has had the effect of reducing the plant delegates' former scope 
for using industrial action to win better terms and conditions. 
France 
There is a  special problem in evaluating the significance of 
trade  unionism  on  the  shop-floor  in  France.  The  difficulty 
2 The National Inter-Industry Aareement of June 16th, 1947. arises from the fact  that the French unions have always em-
phasised the role of their local units as the nucleus of trade 
union activity and have long employed revolutionary sounding 
rhetoric to extol the virtues of militant action at the grass-roots 
level. The reality has been rather different. In practice, unions 
are often at their weakest at this point and until very recently 
their activity has been mainly at the national and regional level. 
French union leaders rationalise this situation on the grounds 
that the main task at the base is an educational one - a battle 
for men's minds. Yet, in evaluating the unions' strength on the 
shop-floor, account must be taken of their patent failure to win 
much in the way of concrete gains for their members. 
The main fact about French trade unions is that numerically 
they are chronically weak. At the most, only a quarter of the 
work force is  unionised. On the other hand the employers are 
well  organised, and for all the unions' revolutionary language 
they have probably had less success in whittling down the range 
of exclusive 'managerial rights' than any other union group in 
Europe. 
Historically,  French  unions  have  also  tended  to  dismiss 
collective bargaining as a  means of obtaining gains for their 
members and have relied on winning material improvements in 
social and working conditions from the state. This is part1y a 
product of their revolutionary tradition. But it is  also partly 
the inevitable result of  their organisational weakness in industry. 
In post-war years machinery was established whereby inter-
mittent labour/management negotiations took place, mostly at 
the provincial  level.  There was  almost  no bargaining  at  the 
national level in individual industries, and for most of the period 
none at all at the plant level.  That plant negotiations did not 
develop was due to management refusal to meet the unions, who 
in turn decided to concentrate on negotiating minimum condi-
tions at national level whenever this was possible. The result was 
that for the most part plant earnings and conditions of  work were 
subject to unilateral decision by management. 
All that existed in the plant by way of worker representation 
were two non-union institutions - a  works  council, a  purely 
consultative  body elected  by all  the workers,  and 'personnel 
delegates', again elected by the entire work force and respon-
sible for processing grievances. Until December 1968, unions had 
no legal right to any direct recognition within the plant and, 
except for a few cases where gains were made during the May 
1968 strikes, unions were effectively barred from the factories. 
Union members were not allowed to collect dues or distribute 
union literature at work under pain of immediate dismissal. 
Since 1968 unions have a legal right to set up plant sections. 
One person, or in a large factory, two people, can be designated 
as union delegates and these are granted between  10 and 15 
hours away from their work, with pay, each month. In larger 
plants the union delegates may be provided with office  space 
and a telephone. But such 'facilities' are often derisory and at 
the  giant  Renault factory  at Boulogne-Billancourt,  the  most 
management can provide the delegate with, to assist him to get 
about, is a bicycle. Unions can now arrange to collect dues and 
give  out literature at work, though usually not on the shop-
floor.  Union  meetings  can  sometimes  be  held  in  the  plant 
although in some cases management insists  on their right to 
attend.  Moreover,  the Industrial Relations Act of 1971  now 
specifically permits plant bargaining. 
This  is  the  background  against  which  French  unions  are 
attempting to build up their strength in the plants. Since 1968 
there has been a noticeable change in their outlook and they 
now begin to appreciate the need for concrete achievements at 
this level. The main stimulus here comes from the Democratic 
Socialist Federation, the CFDT, which has come to recognise 
the importance of a strong physical organisation. But even so, 
progress is  likely to be difficult.  For one thing,  there is  little 
indication that the employers have conceded that there is any 
limit to their managerial rights, and recent figures indicate that 
there are probably far fewer  than 1,000 plant agreements  in 
force in the entire country.3 
Holland 
Dutch unions are certainly the most bureaucratic in western 
Europe, a  fact  very  largely  attributable to traditional Dutch 
3 G. Adam, 1. D. Reynaud, J. M. Verdier, La Negotiation Collective en France, 
Lcs Editions Ouvri~.  Paris, 1972, p.70. 
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conservatism  within  the  labour  movement.  In  the  post-war 
years  the bureaucratic element has  been strengthened  by the 
fact that a  rationalisation of trade union structure has taken 
place, with unions from related industrial sectors being merged 
into one large organisation.  This  restructuring was  from  the 
top down rather than the product of a  spontaneous develop-
ment from  below.  During the same period there has been a 
succession of very tight, centrally operated incomes policies in 
which all major wage questions have been decided at the highest 
levels  of the  economy,  with  only  the national  union leaders 
participating. Not surprisingly, this has not produced an atmos-
phere  conducive  to  the  development  of vigorous  shop-floor 
union organisation. 
As in other countries there have been signs of rank and file 
dissatisfaction  with  this  state of affairs  in recent  years.  The 
extreme centralisation of  wage bargaining that characterised the 
early  post-war  years  and under  which  national  negotiations 
fixed  maximum  as  well  as  minimum  wages,  began  to break 
down in the mid-60s. But even so, most collective bargaining in 
each industrial sector still takes place at the national level. 
Within  the  plants  there  are,  as  in  all  western  European 
countries, works councils. These are not union bodies but are 
elected by all workers, unionised or not, and are chaired by the 
employer. Their functions are almost entirely consultative and 
advisory  in  personnel  or economic  matters  while  in  social 
questions they have the right to negotiate over such limited issues 
as scheduling of holidays, and starting and stopping times in the 
plant. A certain amount  of membership unrest (some of it a 
reflection of latter day radicalism within sections of the Dutch 
Catholic community),  has prompted the unions  to try,  as  in 
Germany, to strengthen their position in the factories. This has 
been developing slowly for 10 years but most of the progress has 
been in the last two or three years. And in most cases the absence 
of  any real grass-roots organisation has made it necessary for the 
union to start building from scratch. 
As  in  Germany,  Dutch  unions  have  'confidence  men'  -
perhaps one for every 15  to 20 workers. These may be works 
councillorS,  safety  committee  members  or  simply  activists 
appointed by the union. And at the head of the core of 'con-
fidence  men'  in  some  factories  there  is  a  'contact  man' 
(bedrijfscontactman) who acts as the overall union spokesman. 
Given the preoccupation in Dutch works councils with economic 
questions  and productivity  performance,  the  'contact man's' 
job is  to focus  attention on social  and human consideration 
within the plant. This is seen as a challenge to the Dutch style 
of management. As much as anything it is basically an educa-
tional  exercise  designed  to  remind  workers  who  have  long 
been made conscious of the question of productivity, that they 
too have some basic human rights at work.  The educational 
work of the in-plant representative also involves responsibility 
for training other plant level union officers. 
As part of their effort to 'capture' the shop-floor, unions in 
the  manufacturing  sector  are  moving  towards  a  system  of 
factory  based,  rather  than  geographically  based,  branches. 
The idea is that within each factory there should be a 'contact 
man'. In larger factories there is a committee of 'contact men' 
with one man assuming the role of factory representative. The 
'contact men' are appointed by the regional union officers for a 
period of three years,  and there are no elections.  At present 
there exist probably no more than 200 factories with an in-plant 
union representative of this sort, and where they do exist they 
are  under the cJose  supervision of regional  full-time  officers 
with  special  responsibilities  for  the  'contact  men'  in  their 
area. To date 'contact men' have only been involved in collective 
bargaining to a very limited extent, and then only in the few big 
firms where bargaining tends to be at the company level. In such 
negotiations  they  merely  act  as  a  support  for  the  full-time 
official who is the chief spokesman on the workers' side. 
However, within the last 18 months there has been growing 
pressure on employers to accord the plant representatives more 
recognition and more facilities. Last spring, for only the second 
time in post-war years, the Dutch witnessed large scale indus-
trial action. This in itself was something of a minor revolution 
in a country where, in the past, any industrial action has tended 
to contain an element of  a strike action against the government. 
On this occasion, amongst the complex demands being made 
was  one  that  'confidence  men'  and  'contact men'  be  given 
wider recognition.  Facilities for them were sought,  including 
the right  to hold  meetings  with  union  members  in working time on the shop-floor, freedom to give out union literature at 
work, and 2! hours per year per member off work for 'contact 
men' on union business.  There was  a considerable amount of 
acrimony over these last points and it is  apparent that there 
will  be a long struggle to establish general union rights within 
the plants of Dutch firms. 
Denmark 
The Danish trade union movement, the oldest in Scandinavia, 
has been influenced by both German and British trade unions. 
The  chief resemblance  to  British  unions  is  in the fact  that, 
unlike  most  Continental  labour  movements,  Danish  unions 
have developed on craft rather than on industrial lines. There 
is  relatively less  union centralisation in Denmark than in the 
other Scandinavian countries. And as in Britain, shop stewards 
are a long established feature of Danish trade unionism. In fact, 
as recognised union officials,  Danish shop stewards pre-dated 
their British counterparts by a number of years. 
Worker  representatives  first  began  to  appear  in  Danish 
manufacturing industries in about 1870, and by 1900 the main 
engineering  union has  succeeded  in obtaining a  special  pro-
vision in the collective agreements covering the recognition of 
shop stewards. Moreover, two years later, in 1902, the Danish 
engineers won a further provision in the collective agreement 
which guaranteed shop stewards protection. This was  19 years 
before the British Engineering Employers' Federation conceded 
recognition of shop stewards. Of 22  large national unions,  12 
had obtained recognition for shop stewards before 1920. 
Shop stewards must be recognised in establishments which 
have more than five  trade union members.  They  are elected 
every year - in some cases two years - by the entire work force. 
In this  respect  the  practice  differs  from  the  British  pattern, 
where  only  union members  are entitled  to vote.  In factories 
where different crafts are represented there is likely to be a shop 
steward for each  craft  group.  And in larger factories  where 
there is  a  shop steward for each  department,  one steward is 
chosen  as  chief  representative.  There  are  rather  more  than 
15,000  recognised  shop  stewards  in  Denmark,  or about one 
steward to 55 workers. The ratio of shop stewards to members 
varies from industry to industry and is lowest in the traditional 
craft unions like engineering where there is one shop steward to 
every 27 workers. Agreements are made on a factory by factory 
basts as to the amount of  time they may devote to union business 
without loss of pay, and all stewards are given protection against 
arbitrary dismissal. At least four months notice must be given 
and this has to be worked. Discharge can only be for compelling 
reasons and during the period of  notice litigation can take place. 
The key  to the Danish shop stewards'  function  is  the fact 
that a  considerable amount of piece work is  practised in the 
country.  This means  that there  is  considerable scope for  in-
plant bargaining over actual rates and time allowances. But the 
distinctive feature about piece work in Denmark is that it has 
traditionally been on an individual rather than a group basis. 
This means that negotiations basically take place between the 
individual  worker and the foreman.  The shop steward inter-
venes if there is a failure to agree at this level. 
In the past piece work often operated on a sub-contracting 
system with shop stewards acting as a sort of sub-contractor to 
his members. This placed him in a role halfway between manage-
ment and union. With the introduction of rather more sophisti-
cated wage payment systems in the early 60s, this arrangement 
has  now  died  out.  But the  steward  still  fulfils  the role of a 
'fixer'4 - somewhere  between  management and the workers. 
The engineering collective agreement, for example, specifically 
states that it is the shop stewards' duty to maintain and promote 
cooperation at the  work  place.  This  is  a  curious  feature  of 
Danish trade unionism.  But the somewhat contradictory role 
of the shop steward is  in itself a  reflection  of a  deep-rooted 
mentality in the labour movement, where union officials at all 
levels  of the hierarchy regard themselves  as mediators rather 
than sectional representatives of their membership. 
While  Danish industrial  relations  are less  centralised  than 
those in Sweden or Norway there is still only limited scope for 
shop stewards to engage in collective bargaining over general 
issues. Collective bargaining rounds occur every two years and 
4 See J. Raffaele, Labour Leadership in Italy and Denmark, Univ. of  Wiscon~in 
Press, 1962. p.l56. 
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negotiations take place nationally within each industry. Only the 
manner of applying the terms agreed at this level are negotiated 
~Y  ~hop st~ward bodies at the 1~1  level and in the shops. A 
llmtted pertod of a month or two IS allowed for this stage, after 
which  the union intervenes at a  higher level  to impose some 
form  of settlement.  Thereafter  there is  a  strict  insistence  on 
industrial peace.  Disputes arising have to be resolved  by the 
labour court while  work stoppages result  in the union being 
fined.  The high degree of financial liability for breach of con-
tract  leads  the  unions  to impose  a  high  degree  of internal 
discipline. And since the national union is the legally contracting 
party in collective bargaining, the shop stewards' influence on 
the collective agreements is rather limited. 
Italy 
Trade unionism in Italy has been subject to so much recent 
change that it is difficult to talk about hard and fast patterns of 
practice. Since shortly after the end of the war the unions have 
been fragmented three ways along political lines,  and this has 
been the main influence on the nature of trade unionism. Moves 
to merge the three union confederations are now well advanced 
and in  the  case  of engineering  a  new  federated  union  with 
900,000 members has recently been formed, thus making it one 
of the _largest unions in western Europe. The three-way split in 
the uruon movement after the war and the close identification of 
union  groups  with  different  political  parties  resulted  in  the 
emergence  of an  'instrumental'  form  of trade  unionism  in 
which union activity was designed to fit in with the posturing of 
th.e  particular political group. For a number of years workers 
witnessed the most cynical manipulation of the unions by their 
leaders and the vigorous rank and file  organisation that had 
been  so  active  in  the  wartime  resistance  was  effectively 
neutralised. 
Collective bargaining was for many years the most centralised 
in western Europe, with all decisions taken at the TUC or the 
national industrial union level.  Not until the mirl-50s  did the 
Christian  Democrat  CISL  (Confederazione  Italiana  Sindacati 
Lavoratori) federation begin to build factory-level union groups, 
and even then it was not for the purpose of encouraging autono-
mous collective  bargaining at this level. Any negotiations that 
~id take.place below the natior~allevel were concluded by full-
trme regiOnal officers of the umon. For a long time the unions 
were suspicious of plant-based union organisations which they 
regarded as a threat to the power of national unions. All that 
existed by way of in-plant workers' representation was the non-
union works council. For Italy this was basically a consultative 
body  which  otherwise  had  responsibility  for  overseeing  the 
application  of  the  collective  agreement  and  for  handling 
grievances at the initial stage. So ineffective was this institution 
that in many instances resulting worker apathy caused them to 
become inoperative. 
The pattern of remote, manipulative trade unionism began to 
break down in the early 1960s, however, through rank and file 
pressure for more control at the base. The engineering unions 
and employers concluded a national collective agreement with 
a clause calling for the detailed application to be negotiated in 
the plants. Theoretically, the extension of collective bargaining 
to the plant level  was supposed to be accompanied by a  'no 
strike' clause during the term of  a collective agreement. However, 
this  has  always  been ignored and is  effectively  a  dead letter. 
Thus  bargaining  in  the  factories  by  elected  plant  delegates 
began to get under way  by the mid-1960s  and this trend was 
reinforced by a change in policy within the largest union federa-
tion,  CGIL  (Confederaziooe  Geoerale  Italiana  del  Lavoro), 
which now placed its emphasis on the workers' own grass-roots 
fight for better pay and conditions. This coincided with the first 
signs  of a  rapprochement  between  CGIL and CISL,  and in 
subsequent years the growth in strength of shop-floor organisa-
tion and the tendency towards unification of the union move-
ment have gone together. 
The biggest  gains in shop-floor organisation were  made in 
1969 during Italy's own version of  the May 1968 events in France. 
Factory delegates began to be elected haphazardly and without 
regard to the divisions in the union movement. Demands were 
put forward by factory delegate committees and industrial action 
was taken locally to back these up. The new emphasis on local 
decision making proved to be a stimulus to trade union democ-racy and m  many places  the plant delegates  were subject  to 
constant supervision and susceptible to immediate recall by mass 
meetings of workers. 
In the aftermath of the 1969 strikes, a new industrial relations 
act has been passed which  legalises  the union presence in the 
plant and recognises  one union representative for every  300 
workers (500 workers in big plants). These representatives are 
allowed eight hours off work with pay each month to attend to 
union business, and in plants with over 200 workers they must 
be given an office.  The law also permits union meetings to be 
held in factories during working hours. Although not required 
by  law,  employers  have  been  forced  to  recognise  factory, 
delegate committees. In the better organised sectors of industry 
such as engineering there tends to be one delegate for every 40 
members  or so.  These  delegates  are  the  foundation  of the 
revitalised  in-plant  union  organisation and their multi-union 
origin has been the basis on which union mergers have become 
possible. 
Conclusion 
All of the countries discussed here have experienced waves of 
industrial  militancy.  In the  case  of Germany,  Holland  and 
Denmark, 1973 saw some of  the most militant action in post-war 
years. Germany experienced an unprecedented wave of  unofficial 
strikes in engineering last autumn. Holland had more strikes 
in early 1973  than at any time since the war. And last spring 
Denmark  was  for  a  time  paralysed  by  a  general  strike  in 
certain sectors. The peaceful industrial image of these countries 
is  taking  a  beating.  Much  of the  militancy  has  manifested 
itself in the form of industrial action on a plant by plant basis, 
with the demands often including calls for recognition of, and 
facilities  for,  factory  union  representatives.  In  many  cases 
the  unions  have  officially  placed  this  among  their  priority 
demands. But in almost all cases the demand originates from 
the base.  It is  an attempt to even  out the balance of power 
between the workers and the employer at the point of produc-
tion. It is equally an attempt to redress the balance of power 
within the union, between the base and the national leadership, 
although in a number of cases the unions have kept this within 
manageable bounds. 
Insofar  as  the  extensiveness  of shop-floor  organisation  is 
concerned, Italy and Denmark rue the only countries that come 
close to matching Britain's dense network of plant representa-
tives. And in the case of Italy it must be remembered that the 
difference  in  union  strength  between  advanced  industrial 
sectors like engineering and some of the other sectors is  very 
great. Not many Italian industries possess  a  factory  delegate 
system like that in engineering. 
s 
Perhaps the key question in judging the shop-floor organisa-
tion as a true emanation of the base is the degree of democracy 
present  in  the  election  of representatives.  The German and 
Dutch in-plant representatives, and to a large extent the Belgians 
too, are more often appointed than elected. In the two former 
countries this means that they tend to act as extended arms of 
the national  leadership  rather than spokesmen  for  the  base. 
In Denmark and in Italy it is to be noted that the delegates are 
elected by the workers as a  whole rather than just the union 
membership. This is alien to the British practice. 
The extent of the delegates' power to represent their consti-
tuents effectively tends to be more a product of the prevailing 
mentality in the labour movement than any official provision in 
law or a collective agreement. After all, in most of the countries 
of the Nine there have been unconstitutional or illegal strikes in 
recent years.  The scope is  narrowest in Germany,  where the 
'confidence men' play such a  subordinate role  to the  works 
council, and in Holland where the long absence of  local bargain-
ing and a tradition of conservatism will take a lot of breaking 
down. In France and Denmark, local bargaining can take place-
except that in many places French unions haven't the necessary 
muscle,  while  the Danish workers' organisational strength at 
the base may be weakened by the tradition of individual bar-
gaining in the plant. Only in Italy and Belgium does more or 
less  autonomous bargaining  take place in  the factories  on a 
wide range of issues, and in Belgium there is a tendency for the 
leaders to try and tie their plant delegates closely to the official 
union and make them subject to control from above. 
Without doubt workshop organisation  is  growing stronger 
within common market countries. Nowhere is the development 
as advanced as in Britain. But starting from different levels of 
maturity, with different  historical  backgrounds and traditions 
to contend with,  organised workers are gradually feeling their 
way towards a system of shop-floor organisation which offers 
more democracy and more control than they currently enjoy. 
Perhaps the single best feature that British unions could export 
to their European counterparts is  their shop steward system. 
Undoubtedly  the  increasing  contact  being  made  between 
continental unions and our own will facilitate this. 
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Union  Main union confederations  Known as  Political tendency  Affiliated  Members  Strong in 
membership  to • 
As percentage active 
population 
France  3-4 000 000  Confederation Generate du Travail  CGT  Communist  WFTU  1-2 000 000  Metal, chemicals 
1 5-20 per cent  mining, electricity 
Confederation  Fran~aise Democratique du  CFDT  Ex-Christian, now  WCL  6-800 00  Metal, textiles, 
Travail  Socialist  public health 
Force Ouvriere  FO  Social Democrat  ICFTU  5-600 000  Civil service 
Confederation  Fran~aise du Travail  CFT  Gaullist  50 000  Motor industry 
Confederation  Fr.  des Travailleurs Chretiens  CFTC  Christian  WCL  150 000  Mining 
Confederation Generate des Cadres  CGC  250 000  White-collar 
Federation de !'Education Nationale  FEN  Socialist  450 000  Teaching 
W.  Germany  8 000 000  Deutscher Gewerkshaftsbund  DGB  Social Democrat  ICFTU  6 500 000  Metal (2 000 000) 
30 per cent  Chemicals (550 000) 
Christlicher Gewerkshaftsbund Deutschlands  CGD  Christian Democrat  WCL  190 000  White-collar 
Deutsche Angestellten-Gewerkschaft  DAG  500 000  Commerce, banking 
Deutscher Beamtenbund  DBB  700 000  Civil service 
Italy  4-6 000 000  Confederazione Generate ltaliana del  Lavoro  CGIL  Communist Socialist  WFTU  2 000 000- Metal, chemicals 
20-30 per cent  3 500 000 
Confederazione ltaliana Sindacati Lavoratori  CISL  Christian  ICFTU  1 500 000- Metal, transport, 
2 000 000  civil service 
Unione ltaliana del  Lavoro  UIL  Social Democrat  ICFTU  5-700 000  Regionally, 
e.g.  Romagna 
Belgium  2 000 000  Confed. des Syndicats Chretiens de Belgique  esc  Catholic  WCL  950 000  Building (175 000) 
55 per cent  Federation Generale du Travail de Belgique  FGTB  Social Democrat  ICFTU  850 000  Building 
Centrale Gen. des Synd. Liberaux de  Belgique  CGSLB  Liberal  120 000  Building, metal 
Luxembourg  45 000  Confederation Generate du Travail  CGT  Social Democrat  ICFTU  30000  Metal 
35 per cent  Confed. Luxembourgeoise des Synd. Chretiens  CLSC  Catholic  WCL  15 000  Metal 
Netherlands  1 500 000  Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen  NVV  Social Democrat  ICFTU  570 000  Civil service, metal 
30 per cent  Nederlands Katholiek Vakverbond  NKV  Catholic  WCL  400 000  Building 
Christelijk National Vakverbond  CNV  Protestant  WCL  250 000  Metal 
United Kingdom  10 000 000  Trades Union Congress  TUC  Social  Democrat  ICFTU  9 400 000  Transport 
40 per cent  (1  950 000) 
Engineering 
(1  460 000) 
Public service 
(1  200 000) 
Ireland  360 000  Irish Congress of Trade Unions  ICTU  Social Democrat  560 ooot  All manufacturing 
30 per cent 
Denmark  1 100 000  Landsorganisationen i Danmark  LO  Social Democrat  ICFTU  895 000  Metal (250 000) 
50 per cent  Faellesraadet for Dansk Tjenestemaends- og  FTF  210 000  Civil service 
Funktionaer Organisationer 
Union membership often uncertain, in  France and  Italy wildly uncertain.  • World Federation of Trade Unions; World Confederation of Labour; International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions. 
t  Including 200,000 in Northern Ireland.  Most of these also belong to the  British TUC. 
Source: Vision magazine, pp.  60-1, February,  1971. European Studies, 18, 1974 
Europe's Frontier Regions 
Jean-Louis Smith 
Almost by definition,  a frontier region  is either beneficiary or victim of  its geographical 
position. Certainly in the past the impact of  frontiers on their immediate regions has more often 
than  not been  negative.  Putting  together  again  what  treaties  and systems of law  over  the 
centuries have  torn  apart  is  at best a slow process.  In  1970,  the  European  Commission  at 
Brussels concluded that after  twelve years there  had been  little  worthwhile progress in pro-
moting joint  regional  development policies  in  transfrontier  areas  of the  EEC.  The  present 
article attempts to provide a general background to the problems involved. 
Frontiers-scars of history 
In an age when international integration in one form or 
another  is  an  increasing  reality,  national  boundaries 
continue to hinder  the  rational  development  of frontier 
regions. Inevitable distortions in regional organisation have 
resulted from artificial and often arbitrary political boun-
daries.  Regions which for centuries were historically and 
geographically  united  have  found  themselves  seemingly 
irrevocably  divided.  Traditional  trade  flows  have  been 
broken, the functional coherence of urban and industrial 
regions dislocated. More generally, the strategic location of 
many frontier zones made them militarily vulnerable and, 
as a result, economic development was retarded. In short, 
international  boundaries  today  remain  lines  of  great 
economic  significance  and  often  serve  to  accentuate 
persistent regional disparities. 
Obviously  within  the  EEC  it  is  no  longer  simply  a 
problem of customs  barriers but normally one of direct 
conflict  in  the  basic  legal  and institutional  practices  of 
adjacent countries, not least the territorial competence and 
specific  powers  of the  local  authorities  involved.  The 
juxtaposition of two national economies still presupposes 
different  social  and  economic  structures,  policies,  even 
attitudes. Wage and price levels, tax and welfare payments 
operate largely within national money and credit systems. 
Thus,  the  possibilities  for  transfrontier  coordination 
between local authorities are clearly limited unless backed 
by  internationally  ratified  bi-lateral  or  multi-lateral 
agreements. 
The resultant disadvantages become very evident in the 
case of  those regions which are potentially bound by natural 
socio-economic  links  but  which  straddle  one  or  more 
boundaries.  Such  regions  can  rarely  be  considered  as 
geographic or economic wholes and develop accordingly. 
Almost invariably,  past planning and development  have 
been carried out strictly according to national affiliations 
and frequently under the control of national governments 
to whom frontier regions are, as the name itself suggests, 
outposts  of a  centralised  empire.  To  take  the  case  of 
France, it is somewhat ironic that the very regions situated 
on its land frontiers which can claim to have escaped the 
centralising influence of Paris have for the most part been 
overshadowed by stronger neighbouring economies across 
the borders. 
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Types of frontier 
No world area of comparable size  is  as  politically and 
territorially fragmented  as  Europe.  Hence  the particular 
problems of frontier regions assume special importance in 
regional organisation and development, not least in their 
geographical extent. Within the boundaries of the old EEC, 
the  so-called  frontier  regions  between  the  six  member 
states  covered  some  20  per cent  of the  total  area and 
accounted for over 25 per cent of the total population. For 
example,  West  Germany's land frontiers with nine states 
total  4,244  kms  in  length.  Excluding  those  with  East 
Germany and Czechoslovakia this leaves 2,507 kms of'  open' 
frontiers across which, particularly since the signing of the 
Treaty of Rome, there has been a growing free movement 
of daily  workers,  albeit  highly  localised  in  particular 
border areas.l 
What has been the influence of different types of  frontier 
on  their  adjoining  regions?  Few  'natural'  frontiers  are 
evident  in  the  present  day  political  map  of  Europe. 
Centuries  of continuous conflict  and change have left  a 
complex  mosaic  of boundaries  and  states  not  without 
numerous local anomalies.  At a very general level,  three 
types of frontier are traditionally recognised, but each with 
varying impact depending on different circumstances. 
1.  Natural  physical  frontiers.  At first  sight  these  might 
appear to represent nature's own boundaries. Thus, with 
the exception of a few restricted localities, the line of the 
Pyrenees  is  seen  to form  an imposing  mountain barrier 
between  France  and  Spain.  The  presence  of this  land 
frontier,  reinforced  for  a  long  period  by  the  general 
economic  stagnation  and  isolationist  policy  of  Spain, 
turned south-west France into a cul-de-sac. As a result, until 
very  recently,  it has  been  Aquitaine's  maritime  frontier 
which has determined this region's main lines of develop-
ment through long established overseas trade links. 
In contrast  to  the  Pyrenees,  the  Alps  have  been  less 
effective as a barrier, in fact quite the opposite. By virtue of 
controlling a number of high watershed passes, the whole 
history  of the  Swiss  confederation  has  centred  on  its 
character as a pays de passage.  This then was  a zone of 
1  The distances of 'frontalier' movements are governed by international agree-
ments. The earliest between West Germany and France (1950) and Belgium (1952) 
applied to a zone 10 kms wide either side of the border. The EEC Commission 
later extended this to 20 kms and further modifications are allowed by mutual 
agreement of the states involved. contact and not of division, as through these mountains 
passed the great medieval trade routes between northern 
Europe  and  Italy.  Today,  this  spirit  of international 
exchange remains strong, and cooperation focuses particu-
larly on improving cross-frontier communications (Great 
St. Bernard Tunnel 1964; Mont Blanc Tunnel 1965). 
2.  Maritime frontiers  can also exert either a  positive  or 
negative influence on economic location and urban growth 
in coastal areas. In the already cited example of Aquitaine, 
the alternating periods of  regional prosperity and crisis can 
be related largely to the fluctuating fortunes of Bordeaux's 
commercial  history  as  influenced  notably  by  external 
events.  Of course,  Europe as  a  whole  has  always  been 
outward  looking  so  that not surprisingly  the economic 
primacy of many port regions has remained unchallenged. 
It is the importance of  maritime trade, added in tum to the 
geographical  advantages  of  high  market  accessibility, 
which has conferred insuperable advantages on the great 
and small ports of the 'narrows' - London, Southampton, 
Le Havre, Dunkirk, Antwerp, Rotterdam. The growth and 
integration of this 'junction zone' can only receive further 
impetus  from  the  completion  of the  projected  Channel 
Tunnel. 
3. Historical frontiers. These lines of history have hitherto 
often proved to be the least permanent as the size and shape 
of European states have changed in almost kaleidoscopic 
fashion. Yet regionally and nationally their impact has been 
most significant. Thus for nearly half a century (1871-1918) 
the northern half of Lorraine, first annexed by France in 
the  mid-seventeenth  century,  was  lost  to  Germany,  a 
division which only served to further intensify the already 
ancient rivalry between Metz and Nancy, the two regional 
capitals  of this  frontier  province.  Unlike  Lorraine,  the 
once politically unified province of  Hainaut, intact until the 
seventeenth  century  and  again  under  Napoleon,  now 
remains  divided  between  northern France and Belgium. 
This century, however, the post-war 'iron curtain' boundary 
between West and East Germany has provoked more far-
reaching problems.  Along the West German side of this 
border zone - 'Zonenrandgebeite' - regional development 
has been stifled by the proximity of this highly sensitive 
frontier. The impact of  this 'closed' international frontier is 
all the stronger because this boundary coincides with the 
line between opposing political ideologies. 
The  variable  impact  of frontiers  on  socio-economic 
development  provides  a  recurrent  theme  in  the  political 
geography of Europe. No better laboratory exists for the 
study of frontier  regions  than the great transcontinental 
region or 'back-bone of  Europe' which focuses for the most 
part on the  course  of the  Rhine.  Yet  this  central  core 
region has always posed an obvious paradox - a contradic-
tion between unity and disunity. 
The Rhine-axis or frontier? 
The Rhine has provided Europe with  one of nature's 
great thoroughfares. Few areas of  the world have witnessed 
so  much  history  and  such  a  concentration  of human 
activity.  Today,  the  Rhine  has  become  a  symbol  of 
European integration, a major axis of economic growth. 
Historically,  however,  the region  has  long  been  one  of 
conflict,  a  frontier  zone  between  the  great  powers  of 
France and Germany which eventually disintegrated into a 
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'political  shatterbelt'  made  up  of small  buffer  states. 
Accordingly, the present day cultural fragmentation of this 
European heartland derives as much from its  pattern of 
political boundaries as from its linguistic divisions.  That 
neither coincides has only added to the complexity of the 
political map,  with  many  bi-lingual  and even  tri-lingual 
states. 
The Rhine's alternating role as  unifier  or divider  has 
been  largely  determined  by  the  political  vicissitudes  of 
war and peace, economic growth and technological pro-
gress  in  developing the Rhine waterway.  Certainly from 
the French side it was always easy to view  the Rhine as 
a  pre-described  natural  frontier  - 'France's  destiny  on 
the Rhine' - although today it is  the national boundary 
for only  150 kms.  It was  the Roman 'limes'  established 
along the Rhine up until the third century which first em-
phasised  the river's  frontier  role.  Centuries  later at the 
Treaty of Verdun (AD 843), the division of Charlemagne's 
Empire and particularly the creation of the great buffer 
state of Lotharingia confirmed the definitive separation of 
France and Germany. At the same time it heralded over 
a thousand years of  conflict for the control of  this extensive 
'march' zone. The eventual break-up of Lotharingia in the 
early  medieval  period  saw  the  whole  of this  politically 
fragmented area incorporated into the Germanic Empire, 
bounded to the west by the 'four rivers' (Escaut, Meuse, 
Saone and Rhone). 
Between  the  thirteenth  and  sixteenth  centuries  the 
Rhine flourished  as part of a  trans-European routeway. 
In 1230,  the St.  Gotthard route had been  opened and a 
thriving medieval trade, not least the transport of English 
wool to be woven in Lombardy, assured the development 
and prosperity of a chain of Rhine towns.  Ironically the 
simplification of the political map of Europe between the 
seventeenth  and  nineteenth  centuries  destroyed  this 
regional integration. This arose firstly through the growth 
and competition of maritime trade with the newly-found 
colonies, and secondly as a result of the mounting political 
instability  within  Europe  stemming  largely  from  the 
growing  military  confrontation  between  Germany  and 
France. In 1648, the middle Rhine had once again become 
a fortified  international boundary,  and largely  remained 
so during the subsequent events of 1870,  1914 and 1939. 
The line of buffer states that finally emerged created a 'new 
Lotharingia but in bits'. 
Even as wars raged during the last century, the founda-
tions for a renaissance of the Rhine's axis role were being 
laid.  The internationalisation of the Rhine waterway had 
been proclaimed in  principle at the Congress  of Vienna 
(1815)  and free  navigation established  by  the Treaty of 
Mannheim (1868). The canalisation of the Rhine had been 
completed upstream as far as Strasbourg by  1890 and to 
Basel ('Grand Canal') by 1933. The St. Gotthard rail tunnel 
was opened in 1882. The massive industrial growth of the 
late nineteenth century in nearby coal and iron and steel 
regions  now  depended  on the Rhine for  transportation. 
In the twentieth century, this renewed vocation has been 
emphasised even  further by  the parallel development  of 
electrified rail links, motorways and pipelines along what 
has  become  indisputably  the  main  economic  artery  of 
western Europe. However, not all  regions astride this axis 
have  benefited  equally.  Reference  to  two  case  studies 
illustrates both the positive and negative effects of frontier 
status. Switzerland-frontiers on the 
crossroads of Europe 
For a small land-locked state like Switzerland, questions 
of frontier  relations  and external  links  are crucial.  Not 
surprisingly, the state has sought constantly to exploit to 
the full  the positive benefits from the position of its land 
frontiers,  whilst  preserving  the  country's  neutral  status. 
The importance of Swiss frontier regions is  three-fold: 
1.  Two  of the  country's  three  major  agglomerations  -
Basel  and Geneva - have frontier  locations  and  trans-
frontier spheres of influence. Basel, in effect, is tri-national 
with a significant proportion of its population resident in 
West Germany and France. Similarly, two smaller towns, 
Chiasso  on the Italian border and Schaffhausen  on the 
German  border,  find  themselves  in  the  same  frontier 
category. 
2.  Switzerland  is  completely  dependent  on  external 
commerce and trade. In fact, its per capita value of  external 
trade is over twice as high as that of her European neigh-
bours. From its position in the heart of Europe, favoured 
by well-developed transport links, Switzerland has always 
derived considerable wealth from transit trade. 
3.  The new  politico-economic  division  of Europe  since 
1957 has  not,  however,  been especially  advantageous  to 
Switzerland.  Being  a  member  of EFTA  facilitates ex-
changes with Austria, but this affects only 167 kms out of 
a total frontier of 1  ,857 kms. The benefits of any decision 
to  join  the  EEC  must  be  weighed  against  losing  the 
country's centuries-old neutrality. 
Nature,  of course,  often imposes  its  own  constraints. 
Economically  the  positive  impact  of  Switzerland's 
frontiers is  clearly highly localised (Map C).  Most of the 
734 km border with Italy lies along mountain crests which 
are largely uninhabited areas. The same applies along the 
Jura  boundary  with  France.  However,  t~ few  nodal 
regions which have developed in frontier locations are now 
of great political and economic importance. In each case, 
the frontier town controls a strategic route-way: Basel is 
the 'gateway to the Rhine', Geneva to the Rhone corridor, 
Chiasso is  on the St.  Gotthard-Como-Milan route,  and 
Schaffhausen on the route which skirts around the north-
west of the Jura into southern Germany. Well over half of 
Swiss  exports and nearly  three-quarters of imports  pass 
through Basel.  As a result,  the growth rates and relative 
prosperity  of all  these  regions  have  been  exceptional. 
Bale-Ville  enjoys  the  highest  per  capita  income  of any 
canton  in  Switzerland,  one-third  above  the  national 
average. In view of Swiss industry's traditional manpower 
shortage,  frontier  regions  have  been  additionally  well 
placed to recruit 'frontalier' workers from neighbouring 
countries into often specially located industries. Three out 
of  every five French workers commuting across the borders 
from regions  of eastern France2 in 1972 came to jobs in 
Switzerland, either in Basel or Geneva. But the country's 
major recipient region of 'frontaliers' in recent years has 
been  the  Canton of Tessin  (Chiasso).  Of nearly  20,000 
workers  entering  daily  into  this  region,  almost  half 
originate  from  southern  Italy  having  now  taken  up 
residence near the border because of  controls on obtaining 
entry permits into Switzerland. 
2  From Lorraine (nil), Alsace (13,300), Franche Comt6 (3,500) and Rh8ne-Aipes 
(20,700). 
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Undoubtedly the privileged status of these Swiss frontier 
regions  owes  much to international cooperation. Physic-
ally,  many  of these  regions  appear  almost  as  enclaves 
within neighbouring states.  Geneva, virtually surrounded 
by French territory, is only attached to Switzerland by a 
corridor sometimes  barely 5 kms  wide.  Although tightly 
contained by these political boundaries, the socio-econo-
mic influence of Geneva (as in other Swiss border towns) 
penetrates far across the frontier. Fortunately, the reality 
of this situation has been recognised by the development 
of free  trade zones,  which  for  Geneva  go  back  to  the 
Treaties of Paris (1815) and Turin (1816) and which were 
finally confirmed by the International Court of Justice at 
The Hague in 1932. Yet, despite such necessary agreements, 
frontier regions by their very nature must always remain to 
some  degree  vulnerable.  The  intrusion  of this  negative 
factor is suggested by the comparative evolution of Basel 
and  Zurich.  Both  towns  have  similar  histories,  first  as 
industrial (textiles) and later as tertiary (banking and com-
merce) centres. However, today, Zurich is twice the size of 
the frontier town of Basel. In the latter case, the physical 
constraints of site certainly preclude the development of 
heavy  industry.  But perhaps of more significance  is  the 
fact that growth is ultimately dependent upon the macro-
economic  decisions  of either  public  or private  interests 
which, at least in the past, have tended to operate within 
national  frameworks,  proving  less  easily  adaptable  to 
transfrontier situations. 
Alsace-Lorraine- France's 
remote frontier 
It is  on the Franco-German border area that national 
differences in political and institutional structures help to 
explain obvious contrasts in regional economic perform-
ance, either side of the frontier. Both Alsace and Lorraine 
have  so  far  failed  to  develop  the  European  vocation 
suggested on any map by their cross-roads position within 
the  EEC.  In fact,  within  France,  these  eastern frontier 
regions appear as remote outposts, blaming many of their 
respective  difficulties  on  the  neglect  of a  distant  and 
centralised administration in Paris. Naturally their situa-
tion is made all the less bearable by the striking progress 
achieved in the neighbouring regional economies of Baden 
and Saarland which, as the imbalance increases, is having 
the inevitable effect of pulling the weaker French regions 
into their orbit. 
The problems of the two French regions differ in degree 
rather  than  in  kind.  In Alsace,  the  effects  of German 
annexation  after  the  Franco-Prussian  war  undoubtedly 
stifled its economic development, a situation which effec-
tively continued during the inter-war years of this century 
because of the German 'glacis' policy towards the returned 
French province. In the post-war period, Alsace has shown 
a markedly slower rate of growth than the neighbouring 
regions of  Baden and Basel. In fact, during the last decade, 
the increase in total industrial employment on the German 
side was five times that on the French side! For too long 
Alsatian industry has remained dominated by small- and 
medium-sized firms.  The long-established textile industry 
has seen crisis  and contraction in the twentieth century 
and not until recently has there been any real evidence of 
new  industrial  growth.  In  contrast,  Baden  has  clearly benefited in its post-war growth from links with Wiirtten-
burg (centred on the great industrial capital of Stuttgart) 
together  with  an  influx  of  skilled  young  immigrants 
from  East  Germany.  The expansion of mechanical  and 
electrical engineering industries is  particularly important, 
and  in  Karlsruhe  (e.g.  Siemens,  Singer,  Daimler-Benz) 
accounts for some 60 per cent of the industrial workforce. 
What has become clear is  that while Baden's economy is 
strongly  export-based  that of Alsace  has  an  increasing 
deficit  in its  trade balance.  In its regional  development, 
Alsace  has  suffered  from  not  having  a  major  regional 
growth centre. Strasbourg still possesses inadequate infra-
structures to fulfil the role and has not been able to rival 
the attraction of Basel and Stuttgart, or even Karlsruhe. 
While  Alsace  has  experienced  some  growth  over  the 
last decade, Lorraine has suffered a complete reversal of 
fortune since the 'boom' years of the immediate post-war 
period. Once called the 'French Ruhr', the region's troubles 
are  those of many other worn-out  industrial  areas  that 
today  remain  over-dependent  on  declining  industrial 
activities. In this case, the iron and coal mines, the textile 
and steel industries have proved most vulnerable. Despite 
its designation in 1964  as  an industrial adaptation zone, 
together with additional state incentives made available in 
1971  because of its frontier status, Lorraine has not so far 
succeeded in developing the further processing of its steel 
in engineering industries on the scale  of those in neigh-
bouring  Saarland.  The  German  Saar  was  also  once  a 
disfavoured border region faced with similar problems of 
industrial  reconversion  but,  in  its  fight  for  renewed 
prosperity, has clearly gained from having its own regional 
government within a decentralised federal constitution. 
With one region overshadowing the other, the effect of 
the frontier has been to generate one-way movements to 
the benefit of Germany and Switzerland. Both Alsace and 
Lorraine  have  increasingly  become  dormitory  areas  for 
'frontaliers'  working  across  the borders in  neighbouring 
regions.  Officially,  the total number has nearly  doubled 
from 21,300 in 1969 to 37,600 in 1972. Yet only 15-20 years 
ago, the flow  was in the opposite direction. Attracted by 
better and more varied jobs and particularly higher wages 
(gross pay up to 50 per cent higher in West Germany), this 
young,  mixed,  mobile  labour force  even  exerts  its  own 
influence on new industrial location decisions. Faced with 
a  scarcity of labour on the German side,  Mercedes-Benz 
located a  factory  a  few  kilometres  north of the Alsace-
Palatinate  border  so  as  to  be  able  to  recruit  Alsatian 
workers. 
The other solution has been simply to build plants across 
the frontier in France, and this in turn brings additional 
benefits in the ready availability of land, direct access to 
French markets,  and in  parts of Lorraine,  development 
area grants. The increase in German investment in Alsace-
Lorraine during the last 15 years has been impressive (Map 
D). Up until the late sixties, over 40 per cent of new indus-
trial jobs in the Alsatian department of Bas-Rhin were in 
plants set up by German firms.  In order to be as close as 
possible to parent plants in Germany, many of the new 
factories are located near to the border (e.g.  Siemens at 
Haguenau is closely linked to their Karlsruhe plant). But 
this geographical concentration also relates to the question 
of language, as firms obviously prefer to remain within the 
Alsatian  language  area where  bi-lingual  workers  find  it 
easier to pick up the German necessary for their jobs. 
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The influx of  foreign capital for investment has not been 
confined to industry. It is  the departure into the field  of 
property which has provoked most discontent amongst the 
people of Alsace. The purchase by Germans of residences 
secondaires in parts of the Moselle and the Vosges,  and 
by Swiss in Haut-Rhin, is not a new phenomenon, but the 
rush now to buy plots of land as  well  is  meeting  with 
increased  local  opposition.  This  continuing  economic 
encroachment by rich neighbours across the border is even 
viewed by some observers as the 'reannexation of Alsace'! 
Towards transfrontier 
cooperation and integration 
Although international boundaries are no longer difficult 
barriers for men or goods, for the frontier regions them-
selves  they often remain dividing lines which in the past 
have made more for rivalry than for cooperation. In the 
postwar  period,  the  Franco-German  agreements  over 
completing  the  improvement of the  Middle Rhine as a 
waterway only date from 1956.  Certainly the canalisation 
of the Moselle, opened jointly by three heads of state in 
May 1964, was seen as an important symbol of  a new found 
European cooperation in re&ional  planning.  Perhaps the 
most important general initiative of recent years was taken 
in 1971  when a  permanent Working Party on European 
Frontier Regions was formed at Bonn with the support of 
the EEC Commission.  This conference  consisted of the 
three so-called Bur-Regions (Dutch-German), the various 
transfrontier associations for  the Upper Rhine (Franco-
German-Swiss),  the  Saar-Lorraine-Luxembourg  and 
Franco-Belgian border regions (Map A). It has since been 
joined  by  other groups  and has  become  an invaluable 
forum for the exchange and pooling of ideas. 
Transfrontier cooperation takes many forms. Most such 
inter-regional associations have grown up as a  result of 
specific  projects:  a  canal widening scheme in Zeeland -
Oost  Vlaanderen,  a  natural  park  in  Ardennes  - Eifel, 
coordinated  communications  development  in  Corinthia-
Styria-Friuli-Slovenia, pollution control in the Bodensee. 
However, the initiative has not always originated from the 
public  authorities  most  concerned.  For  example,  the 
Institut pour Ia Cooperation Inter-regionale (I.R.I.) which 
promotes cooperation between Saar-Lorraine-Luxembourg 
is a privately financed organisation based at the European 
Academy of Otzenhausen. 
Inevitably, by the nature of frontier problems, progress 
towards transfrontier cooperation has been very much a 
· slow  ad hoc  process.  Even  when  objectives  of mutual 
interest  are  agreed  between  adjoining  frontier  regions, 
implementation is by no means automatic. 
Work  on  the  Franco-Spanish  road  tunnel  between 
Aragnouet  and  Bielsa  through  the  Pyrenees,  virtually 
completed in 1970, has long been halted as a result of a 
financial  dispute  between  the  contractors  and  regional 
authorities involved. Such problems are often exacerbated 
by  incompatible  legal  and institutional  systems.  In this 
respect, the necessary adaptation of administrative regula-
tions and practices will usually require ratification by agree-
ment at an inter-state level. The trends towards decentrali-
sation and regionalisation now apparent in the majority of 
European states provide a  step in the right direction in 
i 
1 transferring certain powers and prerogatives to regional and 
local authorities. For example, it would appear essential for 
local authorities in France to acquire a degree of  autonomy, 
flexibility  and control  over financial  resources  that  will 
place them on equal terms with their counterparts across 
the border, whether the authority be a 'Land' as in the case 
of the Saar, a 'municipality' like Basel or a 'Canton' like 
that of Geneva.  Ultimately, there may welJ  be a need to 
create transfrontier public authorities under some kind of 
state aegis.  The only working model that approaches this 
ideal, at least in spirit if not in law,  is  the Swiss-Franco-
German  venture  on  the  Upper  Rhine,  and  centred  on 
Basel (Map B). 
Regio Basiliensis ~revival of 
ancient ties 
History and geography have combined to endow Greater 
Basel  with  a  natural  international  vocation  as  a  trans-
frontier  region.  Situated  at  the  elbow  of  the  Rhine  -
a  cheval sur trois pays - the physical growth of Basel is no 
longer  contained  on the  Swiss  side  but  spills  out into 
neighbouring  Alsace  and  Baden,  and  beyond  which  its 
urban  region  covers  an  area  with  nearly  two  million 
people.  Intra-regional  links,  particularly  economic  ties, 
have always been very strong. Admittedly, political unity 
only came in the Middle Ages, with Mulhouse part of the 
Swiss Confederation until 1798.  In the free-trading nine-
teenth century, these ties had brought about a degree of 
regional integration across frontiers without precedent in 
other  parts  of Europe,  and  reinforced  by  innumerable 
cultural associations within the region. 
Reviving  the  idea  of 'Regio Basiliensis'  came  first  in 
1959  with a new journal of that name published by  the 
Basel  University  Institute  of  Geography  and  dealing 
specifically with  the various problems of the tri-national 
Basel  region.  The  initiative  to  promote  the  reality  of 
5 
'Regio Basiliensis'  as a  properly constituted body came 
from local industrial, academic and administrative interests 
in 1961.  By  1967,  the  first  major  task  of publishing  a 
comprehensive atlas of the 'Regio'J had been completed. 
Created  essentially  to promote  regional  cooperation  in 
planning, culture, education and sport, the work of the 
'Regio' took an important step forward in 1971  with the 
setting up of  a tripartite German-French-Swiss Conference 
for Regional Coordination which now meets twice yearly. 
The new joint working programme (in cooperation with 
the neighbouring Middle Alsace-Breisgau Association set 
up in  1964)  is  much more ambitious in preparing basic 
research  data and guideline  studies  for  future  regional 
plans. Consultation has also been sought on a number of 
more  immediate  local  problems  such  as  environmental 
pollution,  the  expansion  of  the  international  Basle-
Mulhouse airport, intra-regional suburban train and bus 
transport, and not least the growing influx of 'frontalier' 
workers  from  Alsace.  But,  perhaps more than anything 
else,  the pioneer work of 'Regio Basiliensis' has demon-
strated the special importance in a transfrontier region of 
encouraging detailed joint research as  the only basis for 
successful regional coordination. 
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